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Abstract:
TheU.S.Navy has declared humanitarian assistance anddisaster response (HADR) operations as a coremission
in support of the U.S. national security strategy. However little work has been done to illustrate which vessels
are typically deployed for such operations or the costs of these deployments which, as contingencies, are not
part of the regular defense budget. In this work we summarize some of the work that has been done in the area
of cost analysis for U.S. Navy HADR operations and conclude with implications for policy makers.
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1 Introduction
Natural disasters are increasingly affecting more people, resulting in higher costs (see Figure 1) (Guha-Sapir,
Hoyois, and Below 2014). All of this is happening as the world’s population is growing and shifting to littoral
regions. The scale of humanitarian disasters in 2013 was extraordinary and so was the resulting demand for
international humanitarian response. The money expended in disaster relief in in 2013 was a record US$22 bil-
lion. Cost-effectiveness has not been a priority in any decision for responding to disasters ( Grieskpoor, Sondop,
and Vos 1999). A “send everything and we will figure out how to pay for it” approach has been the prevailing
attitude of the United States Navy (USN) in the past ( Moffat 2014).
Figure 1: Economic Damage (in US $ Billion Constant Dollars) as a Result of All Disasters 1960–2014.
The mission of HADR is not the sole responsibility of a single military Service. Geographic combatant com-
mands (GCCs) within the U.S. Department of Defense are given responsibility for conducting military opera-
tions in specific regions of the world. The GCCs develop force structures to provide a HADR response when
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Apte and Yoho DE GRUYTER
requested by the Secretary of Defense and these often take the form of a joint task force ( Department of Defense
(DoD) (2014), xi). The role of the joint task force (JTF) is to bring together the different military Services to fo-
cus on a specific operation and provide for clear command and control of operations until they are concluded.
While each of the military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force) may be called to participate in a JTF, we focus here
only on the expenditures of the Navy.
Since 2004, the USN has responded to many natural disaster events that have involved scores of deaths,
millions of dollars in damages, and have taken years to rebuild. The USN has diverted ships from original
missions 366 times for humanitarian assistance as opposed to 22 times for combat from the years 1979 to 2000,
according to the fact sheets of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Center
for Naval Analysis ( United States Naval Academy 2011). These humanitarian operations were most frequently
conducted by one or two ships, not the substantial flotilla of ships that move large amounts of emergency
supplies and aid the world has come to expect.
Responding to these disasters effectively requires planning as well as specialized resources, services, and
capabilities. Among these are aviation assets. Such assets can conduct precision pick-up and drop-off of per-
sonnel and supplies. Amphibious landing vessels can move large quantities of supplies and relief personnel to
affected areas in the littoral, and have the ability to establish triage, water and food distribution points quickly
that can be secured with appropriate numbers of security forces.
Because of its global presence, as well as the considerable special capabilities that come from special types
of vessels and skilled individuals on board their vessels ( Apte et al. 2013), the USN has been both capable and
willing to provide disaster relief. Since it is forward deployed at all times, theUSN can and does provide a broad
range of relief on short notice ( United States Navy 2015). This fact has not been lost on the international aid
community, which notes “[b]esides having unmatched financial and military resources and a network of over-
seas military bases, the USA has an explicit policy of making its forces available for international humanitarian
work” ( Wiharta et al. 2008, page x,).
An important question is whether the USN will be able to continue and sustain humanitarian operations
in an environment of fiscal austerity ( Apte et al. 2013; Roughead et al. 2013). To answer this question, we
need to better understand some of the important costs that are incurred during a disaster response. Currently,
structured USN humanitarian operations suffer from many shortfalls ( Roughead et al. 2013) that includes a
highly-regulated funding procedure separate from operations in direct support of war ( Apte and Heath 2011).
Three responses to disaster events illustrate the range of capabilities brought to bear by the USN, as well
as the types and magnitude of costs typical during such responses: 1) the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami which
decimated the coast of Sumatra, 2) the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, and 3) the Tohoku earthquake in Japan in
2011. During each of these the USN committed unique assets and capabilities such as vertical lift, specialized
personnel, and specialized equipment (to include hospital ships) ( Ures 2011; Greenfield and Ingram 2011;
Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser 2012; Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya 2012; Roughead et al. 2013).
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, as they are called by the USN, have become
a significant part of the overall USN mission set. In 2007, the USN introduced its Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapowerwhich stressed the national security importance of having a flexible, responsive, andpersistent
naval surface force capability that includedHADR in the Sea Services’ coremission portfolio. Today, the HADR
mission is considered one of the key areas of engagement and a critical operational mission performed by
the USN ( Kaplan 2007). In 2010, the DoD incorporated HADR into its Quadrennial Defense Review which
is a legislatively-mandated review of DoD strategy and priorities. HADR was identified in the 2015 National
Security Strategy as a core part of strengthening US national defense.
However, it is important to point out that the USN does not have a specific mission categorized for HADR
and only diverts assets for thesemissionswhen they are available. Unfortunately, with no framework for costs of
these operations the expense is poorly understood and can exceed even the best cost estimates quickly. TheUSN
possesses an unmatched capability in vertical lift capacity which is often a critical need for HADR operations.
However, in the face of budget constraints difficult decisions will have to be made with respect to trade-offs
between HADR and other missions.
Many significant global challenges, such as global climate change and increasing population and population
density, contribute to increased demand for humanitarian relief aid. However, given budget pressures and the
likelihood that such missions could increase in the future due to the global challenges, such USN capabilities
may not be so readily available in the future. With this in mind, we evaluate the rough order of magnitude
(ROM) estimate of the costs of such capabilities using data from three recent HADR operations. These give an
understanding of the cost per day and the associated capabilities needed. They provide baseline data against
which the costs per capabilities of a potential ‘international relief flotilla’ could be compared. A potential op-
timal flotilla consists of amphibious assault and transport dock ships because of their ability for search and
rescue, aircraft and landing support, freshwater production, berthing capacity, and medical support ( Apte et
al. 2013; Apte and Yoho 2014). The reason for collecting this data is that given such a critical role played by
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DE GRUYTER Apte and Yoho
the USN in the disaster relief world-wide, if for some reason, the USN reduces its involvement during disaster
responses other national or international organizations will have some estimate of what will need to be filled
in.
It is important to note that missions are funded through the regular military budget processes. HADR op-
erations are funded as a contingency; such missions are sometimes funded from outside the regular budget
or sometimes at the expense of other activities. However, few prior studies have inventoried the specific relief
provided and even fewer have examined the costs. Our costs do not incorporate the opportunity cost associated
with conducting a HADR mission versus training or another activity but our contribution to the research and
policy literature is in summarizing the key cost analysis and cost estimation work of USN HADR operations.
This analysis is not only of benefit to the USN but also other national military organizations and humanitarian
organizations for the reasons stated earlier.
2 Literature Review
The existing humanitarian logistics literature comprises published works that address the topic from civil-
military ( Balcik et al. 2010; Pettit and Beresford 2005) and operational and logistics ( Van Wassenhove 2006;
Kovács and Spens 2007; Maon, Lindgreen, and Vanhamme 2009; Jahre, Jensen, and Listou 2009; Chandes and
Paché 2010) perspectives. Numerous DoD publications, regulations, directives, and instructions also address
ideal operational decision and financial management processes. However, to date, few published works report
or estimate the cost of conducting military support for HADR.
Grieskpoor, Sondop, and Vos (1999) examined excess mortality and costs of response by humanitarian or-
ganizations to identify cost-effectiveness in terms of Disability Adjusted Life Year. The case study in Sudan for
visceral leishmaniasis (Dumdum or Black Fever) treatment was deemed to be ‘very good value for money’.
The authors conclude that more attempts need to be made to perform such analyses to inform the world about
cost-effectiveness. More than a decade has passed since then. Given the recent addition of HADR as one of
six expanded core capabilities for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard ( Department of the Navy (DoN)
(2007)) we focus on the costs of humanitarian operations of the USN.
Over the last five years we have been involved in research and analysis of costs incurred by the USN to
respond to natural disasters. Each of these projects utilized the HADR classification described by Apte (2009)
based on speed of onset and geographical dispersion. Such classification helped the studies determine the
disasters to be researched based on their characteristics. The studies collected and analyzed data on the scale
and scope of the following disasters: 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and 2011
Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami. The primary reasons for selection of these three disasters was because the
United States Navy (USN) provided significant assistance and relief in each instance and the disasters offered
enough similarity and difference to make interesting contrasts from a case perspective. Building upon the work
by Ures (2011), Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012), andMoffat (2014), we investigate humanitarian missions
completed by the USN in selected past disasters, summarize the findings and present new questions to the field
of humanitarian and disaster response logistics as well as make some public policy recommendations.
Ures (2011) investigates humanitarian efforts supported by USN during 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2010
Haiti Earthquake and the 2010 Pakistan Floods. The fundamental questions addressed in this research are 1)
whether it is possible to identify the major cost drivers for HADR operations, and 2) whether there is utility
to fusing the disparate and materially different cost information that is required among the various functions
of the DoD to create a better cost estimate? Ures (2011) uses data from the Contingency Operations Support
Tool (COST) used by the DoD to estimate costs associated with HADR. The COST model is a multi-user cost-
estimating tool that models the incremental cost of deployment in four main categories: personnel, personnel
support, operations support, and transportation. It does not model procurement, munitions, military construc-
tion, force recapitalization or reset, working capital funds, security agreements for coalition support, counter-
improvised explosive device/counter-drug operations, or force protection. It should be noted that the COST
model was designed to estimate combat contingencies and not HADR operations. Ures (2011) also reports the
actual costs submitted to the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA) for reimbursement through
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. The DSCAmanages
defense trade and arms transfers as well as defense institution building, international education, and training
and HADR operational reimbursement.
The motivation for the work by Ures (2011) is that specific cost drivers have to be well understood if we
are to accurately estimate costs associated with HADR operations. In this research, funding with a focus on
the types and timing of expenditure is studied. The costs included fixed wing flight operations, helicopter
flight operations, a hospital ship, overall surface ship operations and personnel costs. The estimated funding
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Apte and Yoho DE GRUYTER
as well as reported funding costs for all the three disasters are given. Not all operational costs are covered for
all disasters. Ures (2011) concludes that helicopter vertical lift will be most demanded yet expensive service for
future disasters and that this capability needs to be provided for with sufficient scope and scale for effective
relief. Ures (2011) also concludes that the hospital ship, unless it stays at the location long enough to justify the
massive fixed cost, is more symbolic and often does not justify the deployment. A large-deck amphibious ship
can, at a fraction of the cost, offer a better level of service and can arrive on station in less time.
Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012) follow the methodology and structure used by Ures (2011), to include
capturing data collected by the Navy to be submitted to OHDACA for reimbursement, and apply it to the 2011
Tōhoku Earthquake in Japan. Their analysis advances the work of Ures (2011) in that it includes specific asset
types that incurred the most operating costs. The motivation is to identify the cost drivers and asset types that
will help USN determine the most cost-effective but capable resources. The authors describe reported funding
for capabilities including flight operations, ship operations, infrastructure support and personnel. The costs,
reported and reimbursed, are more focused on flight operations since large portion of the funding was used
there. This capability helpedwith delivering support and supplies, search and rescue, and overall logistics. The
highest costs for ships were fuel costs. They also conclude that helicopter vertical lift will be most needed yet
costly service for future disasters.
Moffat (2014) examined the humanitarian response by USN for 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2010 Haiti
Earthquake, and 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami using costs from the USN Visibility and Management
of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database which reports operating and support costs for USN ves-
sels. The research analyzes the costs to examine which assets have the most capability for humanitarian assis-
tance while being cost-effective. Moffat (2014) provides fuel and land operating costs for individual vessels that
provided relief during the disasters. The author concludes that from the capability perspective vessels with
landing helicopter deck and assault (LHD, LHA) and landing platform deck (LPD) were the most cost effec-
tive. High speed vessels, oilers, and destroyers (HSV, T-AO, DDG) without a helicopter aboard were not cost
effective. The costs reported byMoffat (2014) include the cost of operating the vessel and the fuel costs for flight
operations but did not specifically include recurring maintenance costs of the individual airframes.
To summarize, Ures (2011) looked at the costs of conducting HADR operations and consequently identified
flight operations to be the most expensive. Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012) extended the work of Ures
(2011) by looking at specific asset types and identified flight operations as the most cost-effective and capa-
ble. Additionally, Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012) identified fuel costs to be the highest for surface ship
steaming operations. Moffat (2014) looked at costs from a capability viewpoint and identified vessels that were
cost-effective and capable for humanitarian missions. Figure 2 summarizes the key literature on USN HADR
costs and the cases studied in the key literature, respectively.
Figure 2: Key Literature on USN HADR Costs.
For the purpose of our paper we focus on the costs associated with HADR operations for the 2004 tsunami,
the Haiti earthquake of 2010 and the Japan Tohoku earthquake of 2011. We draw upon the work of the key
research in the area by Ures (2011), Herbert, Wharton, and Prosser (2012), and Moffat (2014). Bringing together
this research provides a rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate of the costs necessary to sustain and carry
forward to future disasters the level of effort provided by the USN during past HADR operations.
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DE GRUYTER Apte and Yoho
3 The Disasters Considered: Three Cases
We consider three disasters and their costs: 1) the 2004 IndianOcean tsunami, 2) the earthquake inHaiti in 2010,
and 3) the Tohoku earthquake in Japan in 2011. The disasters selected have commonalities to the extent that
they all originated in an earthquake deemed to be sudden onset but differ in certain aspects (see Apte 2009 for
a full discussion). The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan in
2011 were sudden in their onset and dispersed over a wide region. The nuclear crisis evolved slowly in Japan.
The earthquake in Haiti in 2010 was sudden in onset but relatively localized in its effects with the capital and
largest city in the country – Port-au-Prince – being the worst affected.
3.1 The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004
OnDecember 26, 2004, an undersea earthquake of 9.1magnitude struck off thewest coast of the island of Suma-
tra in Indonesia. The earthquake was the second largest in recorded history as reported by the U.S. Geological
Survey at the time. The event is commonly referred to as the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake by the scientific
community and Operation Unified Response by the United States Department of Defense. The disaster spread
throughout the Indian Ocean, causing deaths in 14 countries. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand were
the hardest hit in terms of people lost and missing ( United States Agency for International Development (US-
AID) (2005)). A year after the quake the estimated dead were numbered at 160,000 and there were more than
140,000 estimated as still missing ( Margesson 2005).
One of the key lessons learned from this disaster was that money is not a panacea ( Heidtke 2007). Mas-
sive quantities of food, medical supplies and water that were available could not be delivered to the affected
population due to lack of means of distribution. The initial relief efforts were slow to build temporary shelters,
resulting in millions of displaced persons over a nine-month period. This situation was further exacerbated
by a lack of heavy equipment, rotary airlift, and ground logistical support during the reestablishment of habi-
tat, sustenance, and infrastructure ( Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center (2005)). This logistical
need for distribution of supplies, due to absence of prepositioning and compromised infrastructure, could have
beenmitigated through vertical lift of the supplies to the destination. Flight operations played a key role during
the response.
Much of the aid provided by the USN came in the form of logistical services. Within just ten days of the
disaster, the USN had 29 vessels deployed to the affected area that included 58 helicopters which by the 10th
day had delivered over 610,000 pounds of food, water, andmedical supplies ( Ures 2011; Greenfield and Ingram
2011; Elleman 2007). Some areas, such as Ache, could be reached only by helicopter, and only the US military
possessed the kind of helicopter lift capacity required on the scale necessary to meet the need ( Telford, Cos-
grave, and Houghton 2006).
3.2 The Haiti Earthquake of 2010
In January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck southern Haiti from an epicenter ten miles southwest of
the capital city, Port-au-Prince ( United States Geological Survey (USGS) (2010)). The resulting human and
economic impact made this the worst natural disaster to strike the western hemisphere in recorded history (
Department of State (DoS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2010)). More
than 100,000 structures collapsed ( United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2010)) and
approximately 222,570 persons were killed ( Holtzer, Eeri, and Savage 2013). The number of persons affected
has been estimated at 3 million with 1.5 million displaced ( United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2014)).
The immediate needs (during the first 100 h) were for heavy equipment for construction to restore some
of the infrastructure, transportation vehicles, fuel, and mobile phones for communication ( Lockett and
Obayuwana 2010). United States Department of Defense had supply locations for their own needs in neigh-
boring countries and the USN ships. Though the effort was considerable it could have been more timely. The
relief was provided by the USN and other countries, especially the Dominican Republic. About 20 USN ships
and United States Marine Corps provided numerous vertical lifts (14 fixed-wing aircrafts and 63 helicopters) to
survey the damage, deliver the critical supplies and help in evacuation. The helicopter flight operations, again,
played a key role due to devastated infrastructure in Haiti.
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3.3 The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan
In March 2011, the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami triggered overwhelming destruction and loss that resulted
in an immediate global impact. The earthquake resulted in mass casualties, the majority of which happened in
Iwate, Miyogi, and Fukushima. The tsunami that followed severely damaged the nuclear reactors at Fukushima
resulting in nuclear crisis that caused many more problems in addition to disruption of utilities such as elec-
tricity and gas as well as water supply.
Over the course of the crisis, the United States and Japanese governments engaged in far-reaching coopera-
tion, providing relief and aid to affected areas of northeast Japan ( Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet (C7F) (2012)). The
response from the USN was swift. On the first day of the disaster one of the USN ships was on the scene and
providing relief in the disaster zone. At the peak of the support the USN had 21 ships in the area providing sea
and airlift transportation in conducting search and rescue operations, surveying the damage, logistical support
and refueling assistance for Japanese aircrafts. Just as the response was prompt the entire operation was also
terminated rapidly due to the desire of the US government in avoiding the impression of a permanent presence
in the affected region ( Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya 2012).
4 The Disasters and the Costs of Operations
The United States does not explicitly budget for contingency operations and only a small portion of the DoD
budget goes towards the reimbursement of incremental costs associated with humanitarian operations. How-
ever, many costs are absorbed by general operating budgets and hence are not evident to the U.S. Congress
when determining the true cost of conducting HADR operations ( Factor 2011). We summarize the reported
incremental costs that were submitted by the USN for reimbursement by the Defense Security and Cooperation
Agency through the OHDACA budget appropriation as well as the estimated operating costs of the ships that
reported to the disaster area and operated on station as part of the USN disaster response. The incremental
costs submitted for reimbursement by the USN during a disaster response include specific costs incurred dur-
ing the disaster response such as additional supplies, reserve personnel called up to respond, and additional
flight time outside of the time that might have normally been spent on operations and training.
Separate from the incremental costs are the basic operating costs associated with each ship deployed and
on-station during the disaster response are those borne by having the ship operational each day. Drawing upon
Moffat (2014), and utilizing data from the USN Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs
(VAMOSC) database which reports operating and support costs for USN vessels, we have estimated the base
operating costs associated with each vessel responding to the disaster. This estimated cost includes the fuel,
personnel, and operating andmaintenance costs of operating the vessel. The estimated cost does not include the
days spend en route to the disaster location. Additionally, the estimated cost does not include the cost of actual
flight operations but only the estimated fuel consumption used for flight operations during an average day. By
reporting the costs submitted for reimbursement and the estimated ship operating costs we are better able to
understand the range of the costs associated with the disaster response. If we considered only the incremental
costs submitted for reimbursement, we would ignore the base operating costs associated with having the ship
along with the costs of its fuel and maintenance and the costs of its basic crew.
4.1 The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004
Seven days after the earthquake, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, with 17 embarked helicopters, was
diverted from conducting a port visit in Hong Kong to the coast of northern Sumatra ( Elleman 2007). The
amphibious ship USS Bonhomme Richard, with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Group and 25 helicopters,
arrived five days after the tsunami hit shore. The engagement by the DoD included 27 Navy ships, one Coast
Guard cutter, 82 planes, 51 helicopters, and 15,000 personnel ( Elleman 2007). The naval vessels operated as a
sea base (see Button et al. 2007 and Tangredi 2011 for a full description of sea basing) for relief efforts for 40
days. They left the affected region only to be followed by the hospital ship USNS Mercy (see Figure 3) supported
by helicopters from the amphibious assault ship USS Essex. The Mercy provided sea-based hospital services for
34 days.
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DE GRUYTER Apte and Yoho
Figure 3: The USNS Mercy and USS Abraham Lincoln Arrive on Station Near Banda Aceh, Sumatra in 2004 (U.S. Navy
photo by Photographer’s Mate 3rd Class Gabriel R. Piper).
The USN deployed a total of 27 ships off the coast of Sumatra over the course of almost 50 days during its
response to the tsunami (see Figure 4). The incremental costs submitted by the USN are presented in Table 1.
No active duty personnel costs were included because the Navy considered them as “sunk” and not part of the
variable or incremental costs of the tsunami operation itself. The only personnel costs included were those for
reserve or temporary duty personnel called up to support the HADR operation. However, this perspective of
personnel costs as “sunk” is inconsistent with the cost and expense practices of almost any other organization
whether it be for-profit or non-profit. Though the USN currently considers the personnel costs to be “sunk”
future work should explore these costs in more detail.
Figure 4: Estimated Operating Day Costs (in Thousands of 2015 Dollars) of Responding Vessels to the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami Operations Off the Coast of Sumatra.
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Table 1: USN Reported Incremental Costs Associated with the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Operations of the Coast of
Sumatra.
USN reported incremental costs (in thousands of 2015 dollars)
 Travel costs (to move people into and within the region) $252
 Reserve and temporary duty personnel support costs $1745
 Humanitarian relief (infrastructure support and supplies) $818
 Operating support (includes ship steaming days and
flying hours)
$66,384
 Total reported costs $69,198
In Figure 4, we show the estimated cost of each vessel type by taking its average daily operating cost and
multiplying it by the number of days on station. This estimated cost includes the fuel, personnel, and operat-
ing and maintenance costs of operating the vessel. It does not include the cost of actual flight operations, but
only their estimated fuel consumption during an average day. A total of 27 ships and 14 different ship classes
(e.g., amphibious assault ship, hospital ship, cruiser) responded to the aftermath of the tsunami. The estimated
operating cost of all ships in the response is $129.1 million (see Figure 4).
4.2 The 2010 Haiti Earthquake
The aid provided by the United States Government in fiscal year (FY) 2010 totaled $1.12 billion ( Ures 2011). Ap-
proximately $151 million in incremental costs (or $168 million in 2015 dollars) were submitted by the Navy for
reimbursement (see Table 2). Within days of the earthquake, the USN provided 20 ships including one aircraft
carrier, one hospital ship, and seven amphibious ships. The relief was provided by Marine Corps and various
units for construction engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, mobile diving and salvage, underwater con-
struction, medical, civil affairs, and others. The engagement from ship- and land-based aircraft was equally
massive. Surveillance aircraft surveyed the damage caused by the earthquake. Fixed-wing planes helped with
delivery of cargo to satisfy the demand and assisted in evacuations. Helicopters provided the vertical lift capac-
ity critical to operating in an areawithout functioning infrastructure. TheUSNandUSMarineCorps committed
a total of 14 fixed-wing aircraft and 63 helicopters.
Table 2: USN Reported Incremental Costs Associated with the 2010 Haiti Earthquake Operations.
USN reported incremental costs (in thousands of 2015 dollars)
 Travel costs (to move people into and within the region) $1622
 Active personnel costs $37,650
 Reserve and temporary duty personnel support costs $7006
 Humanitarian relief (infrastructure support and supplies) $19,931
 Operating support (includes ship steaming days and
flying hours)
$102,118
 Total reported costs $168,327
A total of 29 ships and 17 different ship classes that responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake (see Figure 5).
The hospital ship was on station for 49 days and a rescue and salvage ship operated in the area for 61 days. The
total estimated cost, based upon the estimated cost per day, is approximately $128 million (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Estimated Operating Day Costs (in Thousands of 2015 Dollars) of Responding Vessels to the 2010 Haiti Earth-
quake.
4.3 The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan
The Tohoku earthquake resulted in over $200 billion in economic damage. The USN has approximately 70
ships, 300 various types of aircraft, and approximately 40,000 sailors and Marines operating in the region on
any given day, providing a ready and capable presence. There were 16 USN ships and 8 Military Sealift ships
provided disaster relief in and around the affected coastal areas of Japan in support of Operation Tomodachi
which took place from April 12 to May 4, 2011. Military Sealift ships were engaged in relief supply transfer to
responding USN ships. The ships engaged in operations such as search and rescue, relief supply delivery on
shore, and aircraft refueling operations. All services from DoD assisted with medical supplies and services,
communications, relief supply, and civil engineering.
Operation Tomadachi took place from March 4, 2011 until May 4, 2011. The United States Pacific Command
estimated total costs incurred fromMarch 12 through June 30, 2011 to be approximately $2.89 billion in 2015 dol-
lars (see Table 3). These costs included the cost of moving personnel (to include DoD civilians) into and within
the region ($8.7 million), reserve and temporary duty personnel support costs for those called up specifically
for the disaster response ($334.9 million), humanitarian relief support which included specific infrastructure
and supply costs ($297.4 million) and operating support costs which include ship steaming days and flying
hour costs which make up the largest part of the total costs (approximately $2.25 billion).
Table 3: USN Reported Incremental Costs Associated with the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan.
USN reported incremental costs (in thousands of 2015 dollars)
 Travel costs (to move people into and within the region) $8712
 Reserve and temporary duty personnel support costs $334,950
 Humanitarian relief (infrastructure support & supplies) $297,403
 Operating support (includes ship steaming days and
flying hours)
$2,254,649
 Total reported costs $2,895,714
Brought to you by | NPS Dudley Knox Library
Authenticated






































Apte and Yoho DE GRUYTER
The total costs to the USN for being on-scene are quite different. Though the specific costs allocated to
Operation Tomadachi were approximately $2.89 billion (in 2015 dollars), the operational and fuel costs necessary
to keep Navy vessels loitering in the area in case further assistance was necessary were also substantial. Taking
data from the USNVisibility andManagement of Operating and Support Costs Center (VMOSC) we have daily
dollar figures (in 2015 dollars) for each vessel that were in the vicinity of Operation Tomadachi either conducting
active operations or standing by in case needed (see Figure 6). There were 23 ships (and 12 vessel classes) that
responded to the Tohoku earthquake. The estimated operating costs were approximately $100.4 million.
Figure 6: Estimated Operating Day Costs (in Thousands of 2015 Dollars) of Responding Vessels to the 2011 Tohoku Earth-
quake and Tsunami in Japan.
5 Conclusion
We have reported the incremental and estimated daily operating costs incurred by the USN for three different
sudden onset natural disasters (see Figure 7). The incremental costs were only those incurred as a direct re-
sult of the disaster and submitted for reimbursement through the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. To capture the
base operating costs, we used data from the USN Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs
(VAMOSC) database which reports operating and support costs for USN vessels. Our work explores the cost of
operations from a budgetary perspective with no consideration for societal and cultural issues which is a limi-
tation of our contribution. However, enumerating opportunity costs and accounting for them in view of efficacy
in the scenario-based environment is something that may have to be explored in future studies of HADR cost
models.
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Figure 7: Total reported incremental costs.
The base operating costs for the vessels responding to all three of the disaster cases presented are remark-
ably similar. The “basic response package” or number and mix of vessels were similar (see Figure 4, Figure 5
and Figure 6). The most significant cost differentiator was in the incremental costs incurred for each disaster
case. Figure 7 shows that the USN spent substantially more in Japan. This may be explained first by the fact
that the USN had many assets in the area at the time of the disaster and therefore all were utilized. Second,
Japan is a close ally of the United States and this, coupled with the fact that there are many U.S. civilians and
military personnel there, results in the U.S. treating the disaster almost as if it occurred in the homeland. Finally,
though the disaster started with earthquake it resulted in a tsunami that triggered a nuclear catastrophe. This
complex disaster event became a crisis that demanded a significant amount of relief and sustaining support
which resulted in high costs.
The USN is only one of the major relief providers responding to disasters around the world ( Moroney et
al. 2013). However, it brings specialized capabilities in response to disasters that few other organizations can
provide. As the United States scales back and focuses its military investments, the USN is not certain it will
have the same capabilities in the future that it has brought to bear in the past. Having an idea of the potential
costs that may need to be borne by other organizations and/or nations will be useful when thinking about a
collective response to future disasters. Furthermore, future relief efforts would benefit from an understanding
of the comparative capabilities and competencies of all the organizations and agencies that respond to disas-
ters as well as their level of interoperability ( Apte and Yoho 2011; Moroney et al. 2013). The integration of USN
capabilities with other partners worldwide could be a longer-term solution and pathway to ensuring the nec-
essary capabilities and capacity are maintained to deliver effective humanitarian and disaster aid ( Roughead
et al. 2013).
Given that our perspective of the cost-model is about incremental cost, it may be worth noting that this
model will shed better light on HADR provided by USN by considering set-up/sunk/up-front costs that could
be used for strategic as well as operational prepositioning ( Apte 2014) such as HADR-pack-up-kits or the
demand estimating drones. Such prepositioning is cost effective as the United Nations (2007) and the World
Meteorological Organization (2009) estimate that every dollar invested in preparing for a disaster saves seven
dollars in disaster response.
To improve communication, coordination, and cooperation, one necessary piece of information is to un-
derstand the specialized capabilities of each of the players and the costs of providing those operations during
a disaster response ( Moroney et al. 2013). As the United States cuts back its defense spending there may be
shortfalls in support provided to disasters and these costs provide estimates to planners inside other nations,
the United Nations, ASEAN, NATO and other alliances and organizations that may wish to fill the potential
gaps. We have shown both the incremental and baseline costs incurred by the USN for three specific, rapid
onset disasters and these costs may be a useful benchmark for determining the appropriate international relief
flotilla necessary to develop in the future as well as where there may be opportunities to gain greater economic
efficiency in disaster response.
We would like to point out that based on the costs discussed here, in the future, the expensive yet critical
vertical lift operations for needs assessment can be replaced with the discoveries in technology. For example,
drones could be deployed for damage assessment to answer ‘where, what and when’ questions for demand
estimation. Another possibility is the strategic prepositioning ( Apte 2014) for the infrastructure, physical and
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social, in addition to contingency planning. A smart way to utilize limited budget is to develop and fulfill
readiness metrics for HADR missions.
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